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Background 
REDESIGNING THE 2ND STAGE 
LUNAR EXPLORATION/SETTLEMENT TEAM 
Marylin h'.. Sheddan, Research Associate 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Unil'ersity 
Daytona Beach. FL 
What will it take to not only get back on track with human exploration of space, but with its 
settlement as well? Is this a goal which can be accomplished to any significant extent during our 
own lifetimes? This paper makes specific recommendations about the possibility of such an 
accomplishment , re-considers the conventional recommendations for an infrastructure to support 
lunar exploration, and argues for several changes in the program as it is generally proposed 
Even with the great new information coming in from the Clementine mission. we have scarcely 
begun to develop a real program which will actually allow us to develop a permanently inhabited 
facility. A whole collection of U.S. and Soviet unmanned explorers. mappers, and probes. 
supplemented by the Apollo program, have provided us wi1h literal tons of information We have 
an ever-growing collection of information about lunar geology (selenology), terrain, radiation 
exposure and other environmental issues. We have concepts and, in some cases. plans, for habitats 
on lunar orbit and on and within the Moon itself In various nations around the world. there exist 
detailed studies of construction techniques adapted to 1/6G. factory concepts and plans, mining 
recommendations for the collection of Helium 3 and endless amounts of speculation about 
eve!) thing from the possibility of diamonds to evidence of former habitation on the moon Despite 
a!l that, there are 110 funded programs for the return of human beings and the establishment of a 
permanent facility on the Moon 
Re-Thi nking the Program Stages 
The Apollo program, those unmanned explorers, mappers, and probes provided a great deal of 
preliminary information . On the assumption that everything which has come thus far is clearly 
preliminary, Phase I of the actual permanent human presence on/in Luna can be expected to relate 
closely to recommendations such as those in the Ride Report Some changes in those 
recommendations. now eight years old, are made below Phase II will begin with the presence ofa 
permanent, albeit extremely primitive. facility on Luna, staffed by a mix of perrrnrnent "loonies" 
and temporary ' g round hogs" -- those who return to Terra Al that time. the sense of 
permanence, of people no longer confined to the home planet will be inarguable Among other 
things, this paper recommends telescoping Phase I so that we can mo\·e more quickly and 
efficiently into Phase II To do that requires re-considering both the history and the !l1ture of the 
plan for a permanent lunar faci!ity. 
In re-reading the mission information from the sixties, one cannot help but think that there were 
actually two lunar programs all along The first one. de\·eloped b~· scientists. engineers and 
academicians began •.vith the unmanned exploration of the moon and the preparatO!)' missions of 
Gemini, thundered directly into Apollo's original 20-mission schedule. and \~as expected to segue 
directly into longer and longer missions on and below the surface of the moon The second was 
clearly driven by a separate political agenda'l Actually, there \\ere se\'eral the President's need for 
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something big and attractive enough to overcome the Bay of Pigs fiasco; then there was the drive 
to "beat them Russians" which pervaded the U.S. during the late 50s and beyond. When it became 
easy to shut down the program, the politicians terminated the scientific missions and did so. Since 
that time, any substantial return of human beings to space in any real quantity and for any truly 
long-term missions has suffered from endless ennui. How to break that grip, and get back on track 
-- immediately -- with or without a manned lunar program on the books? 
Regaining the Inertia 
Ifwe are ever to reach Stage JI, it is imperative that we stop thinking (and planning missions) in a 
strictly linear fashion. We must begin to think in terms of mission concurrency instead of 
continuing the pretense that a permanent human presence in space is somehow isolated from 
space activities which are more politically acceptable. The key is in using missions which are 
funded, whatever they may be, to accoinplish the maximum number of tasks. One currently 
developing unmanned mission provides an excellent example: Lunar Discovery Orbiter. 
Assuming, of course, that the U.S. space program and the Lunar Discovery Orbiter program itself 
survive the current American anti-intellectual and anti-technology blitz, the mission objective for 
that program is to provide "the first high-resolution global survey" regarding lunar composition, 
gravity and topography, and imagery". This program was developed as a part of the NASA 
Discovery Program, each concept developed by some of the best minds in the world to make 
available the most science "bang for the buck" That is politically and economically sound and, if 
the technology is well done, scientifically effective as well But an effective return to the moon 
can be developed far more quickly if we can just manage to provide program planners with a 
sound rationale for using high-return, comparatively low-cost missions for secondary purposes. It 
does not hurt any that the second goal of the program is to "Pursue innovative ways of doing 
business". 1 So how can missions be re-arranged to do "double duty" and what can be 
accomplished in that almost incidental fashion which will forward the Lunar program? 
We in the aerospace industry have become tightly focused, our professional survival within the 
extremely fragile space program so aependent on meeting only the mandates placed upon us that 
any alternative is considered intrusive at best and, at worst, program threatening. Yet we can 
move noticeably, significantly closer to Stage 2 aclivities and, in the process, shorten Stage I, if 
we can only force ourselves to set aside tunnel vision during the earliest mission planning stages 
Are there 35 or 40 cubic centimeters of space here and there in the Lunar Discovery orbiter -- or 
can such small increments of space be put there by slightly altering its design? The STS may seem 
an odd analogy, but its GAS-can program pro..,ides the seed of an excellent idea The GAS 
program was developed as a way of carrying additional small experiments in the cargo bay of the 
STS by supplying small containers in areas which would otherwise be wasted. In the instance of 
the STS, those little bits of space are filled with experiments. But it need not be experiments 
which are crammed into tiny corners of the Lunar mission hardware. Tools, sensors, and other 
long-life devices could be attached to or stored in the hardware for any mission which is gain£ to 
remain in lunar orbit for an extended period and/or remain on lhe moon. Sufficient mass/weight to 
anchor them in position is negligible -- even a package of a few ounces will remain where it is 
1
"The Discovery Program Concept"; NASA WWW; downloaded January S, 1 995~ mosi recent upd.'lle logged as 20 
Dec. 1994. 
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dropped, ready to be picked up and utilized when we finally do send people back. And ifthe craft 
is actually going to be left on the Lunar surface at the end of its mission, then so much the better 
"Extra" items can be stocked in every possible square inch to the maximum extent possible 
without jeopardizing the stability or mass of the hardware 
This concept can be significantly enhanced if mission planning can be altered in one other 
extremely significant fashion. If it is in any way possible, mission design should be reconsidered to 
explore ways in which the hardware can, at the end of its other mission activities, be programmed 
to "park" in a specific place. A related effort might be based on the fact that there are insufficient 
experiments cleared in time for any given shuttle flight !O ensure that GAS cans are all filled It 
may be time to reconsider the possibility of filling some of that space with payloads which can be 
launched from shuttle and then boosted toward lunar orbit. On a somewhat grander scale, it may 
now be the time to pull old studies off the shel( dust them off, and seriously re-consider the 
Hitchhiker program, which was designed to permit the shuttle orbiter to carry small loads 
intended for deep space. While the program was once deemed unfeasible for both technical and 
economic reasons, technology has changed radically and the program may now be feasible 
Regardless of the method by which small supply loads are launched, the time it will take them to 
arrive and land remains irrelevant as long as we have no manned program anyway. The primary 
design constraints would be the ability of the container to survive the trip to lunar orbit, sufficient 
power to ensure that it can be boosted gently toward the Moon, and that it carry suflicient 
telemetry to direct to and through Lunar orbit . 
There is one more hardware option which mus/ also be considered, and that is the recent activity 
in single-stage-to-orbit technology. If we are serious about a permanent facility on the moon, the 
development of such launchers as the Delta Clipper, X-33 and/or the X-34 is imperative. None of 
that should be deemed a reason to delay the early stages of a lunar program, however During the 
development stages of American launch capability, it appears entirely feasible to 
internationally available heavy lifters to begin boosting equipment toward the Lunar surface 
Site Selection 
Assuming that small payloads are actually sent to the lunar surface, where should all these items 
be allowed to drop? Numerous studies have recommended specific sites for the development of 
the first permanent Lunar facility. They have been analyzed for scientific potential, general 
location, and curiosity value. With so many potential sites available, and so few already explored, 
it may seem appropriate to commission another study. However, doing so will 1101 shorten Phase I 
or advance the start of Phase II lunar exploration and settlement At this point, it seems 
appropriate to simply say, "Just pick one site and do it!" Contrary to some mission planning 
traditions, when it comes to the Moon almost any site is legitimate My personal preference is 
Mare Fecunditatis, but it doesn't really matter. lfwe can convince ourselves to select one site and 
start dropping off supplies there, then, when the day comes that we finally develop the collective 
will to get off our backsides and take people back there, the site with supplies already stocked up 
will make itself the logical base camp 
Re-Thinking WHO Should Go 
Off and on through the years, our space program policy makers ha\·e toyed with the idea of 
.... 
allowing someone other than "traditional" astronauts into space. Of course, the concept of 
"civilians in space" is a whole separate issue. In a way, it has been addressed -- to a limited extent 
-- by the payload specialist program. However, rapid advancement to Phase II lunar exploration 
aod settlement require much more attention to the idea of putting people on the moon who may 
or may not have strong public relations value, but whose sole purpose in going is to advance the 
development of the facility itself. Intellectually, many of us recognize that the time will come 
when we need to take someone other than (or, more precisely, in addition to) the NASA 
standard-issue astronaut on Luna. Though the analogy is somewhat simplistic, it is useful to think 
again of the days when sailing vessels carried settlers to the "New World". Comfort and ease of 
travel were not particularly relevant -- nor did the lack of those things prevent committed people 
from setting out on the journey 
Intellectually, we know that we must carry technicians, construction workers, and field engineers 
to the Lunar surface, but when the time comes for mission planning, that phase always seems to 
be "out there somewhere" -- after scientists have returned and finished their explora!ion, gathered 
more samples, photographed th~ dark side, measured the radiation hazard, planted seismometers, 
and the government has announced its blessing for the presence of "civilians". Moving as quickly 
as possible ioto Phase II requires that we face, directly and without flinching, the need to expand 
the types of people we will take into space 
The New Crew -- Recommendations for Lunar Exploration/Settlement Teams 
Dr. Ride's report recommended an outpost of eight people, slowly growing to as many as fifty 
through a number of years. Stafford et al recommended a startup return group of six to 12 people 
with 45 days of life on the surface in some sort of habitat, with the emphasis on using a lunar 
rover to go further and further from the facility -- still a mission of preliminary exploration rather 
than permanence. To further complicate these issues, there is a large body of literature which 
discusses the isolation of small groups and the disastrous potential of placing eight people alone in 
an extreme environment. Almost inevitably, such groups polarize, jeopardizing not only the 
mission but, quite frequently, the lives of mission participants. 
With those issues, and the goal of advancing Phase I I level lunar activity as quickly as possible, 
the following crew recommendations are made: two career astronauts on the lunar surface (none 
on lunar orbit); one astronaut who is also a scientist on the surface; two tech people, construction 
workers, or others (e.g., Corps. of Engineers) as part of the landing party. 
Age spread is probably one of the most critical crew criteria. There's something utterly depressing 
about the idea of a Lunar base without a Pete Conrad, a Storey Musgrave, or someone equally 
colorful. But there is a much more important reason for including experienced people in the crew. 
It takes only a few interviews with people who have spent extended periods confined in small 
quarters with others they might not even like to discover that the reason they were able to survive 
was because of the attributes which their age gave them. One survivor of an extended period in 
the Arctic recalled a 4-man team with an age spread of 27 to 52 sharing a single tent for months 
on end. "Tolerance was a critical issue," he said -- and also pointed out that, as time went on, the 
four men "developed more or less the same lifestyle." 
Skills diversity may be as important as age. In addition to the obvious skills requirements -- being 
able to operate the hardware, run the scientific experiments, and collect exploratory data, the 
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crew of a serious Phase II effon must have other abilities. For instance, it is probably not 
necessary to take along a physician, but having more than one person on board who is highly 
trained as a paramedic and/or emergency medical technician not only seems logical, but 
imperative. Construction skills·· the ability read a blueprint, to blast basic shelter Ot!t of the lunar 
hardpan and to hook together functioning habitats or facilities from whatever is available at hand 
more closely resemble the description of an Englishman dropped off at the Australian penal 
colony than the picture of the classic American astronaut. Yet these are precisely the skills that 
will be needed in the early stages of Lunar development. Finally. if this crew is truly intended IO 
be the forerunners of a permanent human presence, then a mix of genders and cultures must be 
introduced as early as possible·· preferably staning with the first mission 
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